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Proposa I  for  ·a 
COUNCIL  REGULATION  (EEC) 
Brussels.  12  July  1991 
prohibiting to honour  IraQi claims with  regard  to contracts and 
transactions affected  by  the United  Nations Security Council 
resolution 661  (1990)  and  related  resolutions 
(presented by  the  Commission) - 1  -
EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
1.  General  Considerations 
1.  After  the  Invasion of  Kuwait  by  Iraq,  the  United  Nations Security 
councl 1 adopted  resolution 661  (1990)  and  related resolutions, 
Imposing  Inter  alia an  economic  and  financial  embargo  on  Iraq. 
The  embargo  forced  non-Iraqi  operators  to discontinue  commercial 
or  economic  relations with  Iraq  and  brought  to  a  halt  the 
performance of  contracts already  concluded. 
On  the  3  Apr I I  1991  the  United  Nations Security Council  adopted 
resolution  687  (1991).  This  so-c~1 led  "cease-fire"  resolution 
foresees  Inter  alIa  the  I lftlng of  the  embargo,  after  the 
fulfl I lment  of  the  necessary  conditions  by  Iraq. 
Paragraph  29  of  this  resolution  reads: 
(The  Security Council)  "Decides  that all  States,  Including  Iraq, 
shal I  take  the  necessary measures  to  Insure  that  no  claim shal I 
1  I  e  at  the  Instance of  the  Government  of.  Iraq,  or  of  any ·person 
or  body  In  Iraq,  or  of  any  person  claiming  through or  for  the 
benefit of  any  such  person or  body,  In  connection with  any 
contract  or other  transaction where  Its performance  was  affected 
by  reason of  the measures  taken  by  the  Security Council  In 
resolution 661  (1990)  and  related  resolutions;" 
2.  Paragraph  29  thus  provides  for  protection of  economic operators 
against  unjustlfled.clalms by  Iraqi  Individuals,  companies  or 
organizations.  In  doing  so,  It  prevents  Iraq  from  obtaining 
compensation  retroactively  for  the  negative effects of  the 
embargo. - 2  -
Regarding  exposure  to claims  from  l:raQ,  the  banking  sector  as 
well  as  European  International  contractors,  have  pointed to  the 
fact  that  a  lifting of  the  embargp  could  give  rise  to an 
avalanche of  reQuests  for  payment  o~ performance  bonds, 
guarantees,  stand-by credits or  similar  Instruments under 
existing contracts and  transactions  for  reasons of  non-
performance  ..  The  estimated  amount  of  money  Involved  exceeds 500 
million  ECU  .•  Already  now  exposure of such  a  dimension  seriously 
reduces  the  financial  room  for  manoeuvre  of contractors.  If  the 
corresponding claims would  effectlve·ly  have  to be  honoured·,  the 
conseQuences  on  com pan I  es  wou.l d  be  drama t I  c . 
As  regards  the  position of  IraQ,  obtaining payment  would  mean  an 
Important  financial  advantage  which  would  clearly be  In 
contradiction with  the  very  obJective pursued  by  the embargo. 
3.  Under  these  conditions,  §  29  gives a  clear  signal  that  both 
conseQuences  of ·admitting claims  (I.e.  losses  for  non-IraQI 
operators and  compensation  to  IraQ)  are unacceptable  to  th~ 
International  community.  It·  Is  Important  that  In  Implementing  the 
UN  decision,  the effect of  this signal  Is  not  weakened.  This  Is 
all  the more  true,  as  there  Is,  for·  the  time  being,,  no  Indication 
that  the  embargo  could effectively be  lifted,  given  the  apparent 
reluctance of  IraQ·  to comply  fully with all  cond.ltlons  set out  In 
Resolution  687. 
It  also seems  clear  that  the  practl"cal  result  Intended  by§ 29 
can  only  be  achieved  If  the  prlnclpl•s contained therein are. 
Implemented  In  a  uniform  way.  In  a  great  number  of  cases, 
contracts or  transactions concerned  Involve  companies  and  banks 
In  different  countries.  Different  national  approaches  as  regards 
the modalities of  protection granted are  therefore bound  to 
weaken  the efficiency of  such  protection altogether.  Furthermore, 
such  dIfferences wou I  d  gIve  rIse.  to  d.J stort I  on  of  competItIon 
between  operators  In  different  countries,  thus  affecting common 
commercial  pol Icy.  This calls for  Implementation,  at  Community 
level,  by  a  Community  Instrument.  It  also  requires. close 
consultation between  the  Community  and  third countries,  In 
particular  OECD  members. - 3  -
11.  Specific considerations 
The  measures  proposed  here~lth  In  order  to  Implement  §  29 of  UNSC 
Resolution 687  (1991)  are based  on  the  following  specific 
considerations: 
1)  Non-enforceabll lty  of  claims or  prohibition  to  pay 
§  29  can  be  Interpreted either  as  making  claims  by  Iraq  non-
enforceable,  or  as  est~bllshlng a  prohibition  to  honour  such 
claims:  The  practical  consequences of  each  Interpretation are 
different.  A system of  NON-ENFORCEABILITY  would  protect  banks  and 
exporters against  claims mentioned  In  paragraph  29  of  UNSC 
Resolution 687,  by  making  It  Impossible  for  any  Iraqi  party  to 
obtain a  judgment  In  Its  favor  unless  It  could  prove  that  the 
contract or  transaction was  not  affected by  the embargo. 
However,  such  a  system would  a! low  claims  being settled by 
agreement  between  the  parties concerned.  This would  considerably 
weaken  the  protectlon·granted,  as  It  would  expose  non-Iraqi 
operators,  In  particular contractors,  to pressure which  might  be 
exerted  by  the  Iraqi  side.  It  would  also create uncertainty as  to 
whether  the  contracts concerned  would  stl I I  have  to be  treated as 
val ld  obi lgat!ons.  Finally,  this system  would  not  permit  the 
achievement  of  the other  objective of§ 29,  I.e.  the  prevention 
of  retroactive compensation  In  favour  of  Iraq. 
Therefore,  the  Commission  proposes  a  system of  PROHIBITION  TO 
HONOUR  CLAIMS,  which  would  allow  to meet  both  the obJective of 
preventing such  retroactive  compensation  as well  as  the objective 
of  an  effective prptectlon of  non-Iraqi  parties,  and  would 
establIsh clarity as  regards  the  treatment  of  the contractual 
obligations concerned. 
Furthermore,  Member  States  should  take alI  steps  required  In 
order  to ensure effectiveness of  the  prohibition,  Including  the 
establ lshment  of  sanctions  In  case of  non-respect. - 4  -
2)  Burden  of  oroof 
The  protection granted to non-Iraq!  parties would  be  Imperfect  If 
contractors or  banks,  when  defending  themselves  against  Iraqi 
claims,  would  have  to prove  that  the  condlti'ons of  §  29  are met. 
Therefore,  the burden  of  proof  should  be  reversed.  Consequently, 
contracts or  transactions with  regard  to which  claims are made 
are  regarded  as  having  been  affected by  the embargo,  unless  the 
claimant  provides  proof  to  the contrary. 
3)  possible exceptions 
Although  the Commission  recognizes  that  an  unrestricted 
application might  In  some  cases  lead  to  hardship,  It  appears 
Impossible  to define  In  a  general  way,  situations  In  which  the 
performance of  a  contract  has  not  been  affected by  the  embargo. 
The  Commission  Is  therefore of  the opinion  that  exceptions  from 
the  general  rule  should  be  limited  to  the case where  payment  has 
been ordered by  a  court  or  a  comparable  authority  provided  the 
legislation applied  provides  for  an  effective  Implementation of 
the principles contained  In§ 29  of  UNSC  Resolution 687. 
4)  Relationship  between  contractors  and  banks 
Finally,  the  Issue of  INDEMNITIES- I.e.  the  right  of  a  party 
which  has  honoured  a  claim, .to obtain  the  repayment  by  another 
party- needs  to be  addressed.  Indemnities  have  normally  to be 
paid by  exporters  to banks  when  the  latter  have  paid out  a 
guarantee.  lndemnlsatlon  Is a1so granted  by  export-credit 
Insurers  to exporters,  when  the conditions of  the credit-
Insurance  policy are  fulfilled. 
As  a  principle,  no  right  to  lndemnlsatlon  can  be  recognized  where 
the claim should  not  have  been  honoured.  The  question arises, 
however,  If  parties should  be  allowed  to obtain  Indemnity  for 
payments  that  they  were  forced  to make,  e.g.  through  legal 
execution,  although  the  Iraqi  party was  not  entitled to  the 
payment  under  §  29  of  UNSC  Resolution  687  (1991). - 5  -
While  the Commission  recognizes  that  In  such  cases  It  could  seem 
Inadequate  not  to open  the  posslbl llty of  recourse,  this 
possibility  Is  not  Included  In  the  present  proposal.  It  would 
considerably weaken  the position of  exporters whereas  banks 
appear  to be  In  a  relatively stronger  position vis-a-vis  Iraqi 
clalments;  th  fact,  so  far  no  cases of  legal  execution or  similar 
measures  against  banks  seem  to have  occurred.  The  question may, 
''  however,  have  to be  reconsidered  In  the  light of  further 
experience. COUNCI.L  REGULATION  (EEC)  No  ........  /91 
of  . . . . . . . .  1991 
prohibiting  to  honour  IraQI  claims with  regard  to contracts and 
transactions affected by  the United  Nations  Security Council  resolution 
661  (1990)  and  related resolutions. 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUN·I TIES, 
Whereas,  under  Regulation  (EEC)  N"2340/9Q(1)  and  (EEC)  N"3155/9Q(2), 
both  as  last  amended  by  Regulation  (EEC)  N"1194/91(3),  the Community 
has  taken  measures  to prevent  trade  by  the  Community  as  regards  IraQ; 
Whereas  as  a  conseQuence  of  the  embargo  against  IraQ  economic  operators 
In  the Community  and  third countries are exposed  to  the  risk of  claims  by 
the  IraQI  side; 
Whereas  It  Is  necessary  to protect operators against  such  claims and  to 
prevent  IraQ  from  obtaining  compensation  for  negative effects of  the 
embargo; 
Whereas  the  Security Councl I  of  the  United  Nations  adopted  resolution 687 
(1991)  of  3  April  1991  which,  In  Its paragraph  29,  deals with  claims  by 
IraQ  In  relation with  contracts and  transactions affected by  measures 
taken  by  the Security Council  In  resolution 661  (1990)  and  related 
resolutions; 
Whereas  the Community  and  Its Member  States have  agreed  to establIsh a 
Community  Instrument  In  order  to ensure  an  uniform  Implementation, 
throughout  the Community,  of  paragraph  29  of  the Security Council 
resolution 687  (1991); 
(1)  OJ  N"  L 213,  9.8.1990,  p.1 
( 2)  OJ  N.  L 304,  1 . 11 . 1990 ,  p . 1 
(3)  OJ  N"  L  115,  8.5.1991,  p.37 Whereas  such  an  uniform  Implementation  Is  necessary  to achieve  the  alms 
of  the Treaty establishing  the  European  Economic  Community  and  whereas  no 
other  powers  are available  In  the Treaty  than  In  article 235; 
Having  regard  to the Treaty establishing  the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  In  particular Article 235  thereof; 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the  Commission; 
Having  regard  to  the opinion of  the  European  Pari lament; 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION: 
ARTICLE  1 
For  the  purpose  of  the  present  Regulation 
1)  "contract" or  "transaction" means: 
any  contract  or  transaction,  Including guarantees,  bonds  (e.g. 
performance  bonds,  bid bonds),  stand-by credits,  subcontracts. 
2)  "claim"  means  any  demand  or  action on  the  side of  a  party  to a 
contract or  a  transaction  for  the  fulfillment  of  an  obligation 
!esultlng from  or  connected with  such  a  contract  or  transaction  by 
another  party,  such  as: 
a  demand  to pay  a  bond  or  guarantee; 
a  demand  to continue or  to start activities foreseen  under  a 
contract  or  transaction; 
a  demand  to provide  Indemnity  for  a  payment  made  under  a  contract 
or  a  transaction; 
a  demand  for  an  InJunction  from  a  court,  for  an  arbitral  award  or 
for  the execution of  such  InJunction or  award. 
' 3)  "measures  taken  by  the  Security Councl I  In  Res61utlon  661  (1990)  and 
related  resolutions"  means  measures  of  the  United  Nations  Security 
council,  and  measures  Introduced  by  the  European  Communities,  any 
country or  International  organization  In  pursuance of  the  relevant 
decisions of  the Security Councl I,  or  any  other  action authorized  by 
the Security Council  In  respect  of  the  Invasion of  Kuwait  by  Iraq, 
such  as military activities  In  connection with  the  liberation of 
Kuwait; 
4)  "person or  body  In  Iraq"  Includes  any  person or  body  resident  In 
Iraq,  any  body  Incorporated or  constituted under  law  of  Iraq  and  any 
body  controlled by  any  persons or  bodies  resident  In  Iraq or  bodies 
Incorporated or  constituted under  the  law  of  Iraq; 
ARTICLE  2 
As  from  3  April  1991.  It  shall  be  prohibited  to honour  any  claim made  by 
the  Government  of  Iraq,  or  any  person or  body  In  Iraq,  or  any  person 
claiming  through  or  for  the  benefit  of  any  such  person or  body,  directly 
or  Indirectly.  In  connection with  any  contract  or other  transaction where 
Its performance  was  affected by  reason of  the measures  taken  by  the 
Security Council  In  Resolution  661  (1990)  and  related resolutions. 
ARTICLE  3 
Without  preJudice  to existing prohibitions with  regard  to commercial  and 
financial  relations with  Iraq,  Article  2  does  not  apply,  when 
and 
a)  a  claimant  has  obtained a  judgment  from  a  court or  an  award  or  an 
equivalent  decision  that  the  performance of  the  contract  or 
transaction was  not  affected  by  measures  mentioned  In  Article  2 b)  the  Judgment,  award  or  equivalent  decision was  obtained within 
the  jurlsdl~tlon of  a  country  that  had  faithful IY  Implemented  the 
measures  taken  by  the Security Councl I  In  resolution 661  (1990) 
and  related  resolutions,  and  In  particular  paragraph  29  of 
resolution 687  (1991). 
ARTICLE  4 
The  onus of  proving  that  the  performance of  the  contract  or  transaction 
was  not  affected by  measures  mentioned  In  Article  2.  shall  be  on  the 
person making  a  claim. 
ARTICLE  5 
The  Member  States will  take  the  necessary measures  to ensure  the 
effectiveness of  the  disposition of  Ar.tlcle  2.  3  and  4. 
ARTICLE  6 
This  Regulation  shall  enter  Into force on  the  day  of  Its publication  In 
the Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities. 
This  Regulation shall  be  binding  In  Its entirety and  directly appl lcabte 
In  all  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels •......  1991 
For  the Counc I I 